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ABSTRACT
Clear normative grounds for the information obligation are visible in the Di-
rective (EU) 2016/97 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 Jan-
uary 2016 on insurance distribution (hereinafter: IDD) . One of  the challenges 
before insurance law is to answer the question of whether and how one should 
sanction violations of disclosure obligations resulting in the absence of the desired 
insurance protection . In this aspect important legal problem is the law applicable 
to the assessment of liability for violation of disclosure obligations by the insurer .
The second important problem is the law applicable to the assessment of li-
ability for violation of disclosure obligations by third parties vis-a-vis the insurer . 
Some remarks concerning jurisdiction in matters relating to the loss of chance to 
become insured have different practical implications .
Key words: IDD, the loss of chance to become insured, information obligations, 
the law applicable, the third party of insurance
1 . INTRODUCTION
The insurance contract is generally qualified as a contract of utmost 
confidence (contractus uberrimae fides) based on the good faith principle . 
This principle should be understood as a requirement to take into account 
* Associate Professor Hab ., PhD, The Faculty of Law and Administration, University 
of Silesia .
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the interests of the counterparty at the stage of concluding and performing 
the contract1 .
One of the basic manifestations of good faith in the insurance contract 
is the existence of pre-contractual disclosure obligations2 . It must be em-
phasized that such obligations are mutual . On one hand, the party seeking 
insurance protection is imposed with the obligation to provide the insurer 
with the information relevant to the assessment of risk3, on the other one, 
the insurer is expected to notify the policyholder about the circumstances 
affecting the decision on the conclusion of the insurance contract4 .
The widely understood information obligation may take three forms, 
namely the duty to provide guidance, duty to draw attention and duty to 
give advice5 .
Clear normative grounds for the information obligation are visible 
in  the Directive (EU) 2016/97 of  the European Parliament and of  the 
1 See F . Reichert-Facilides, Contract Law: General Aspects In: H . Heiss, M . Lakhan, 
eds ., Principles of  European Insurance Contract Law: A  Model Optional Instrument, 
München 2011, p . 144–146 .
2 T . Pfeiffer, New Mechanisms for Concluding Contracts, In: R . Schulze (ed .), New 
Features in Contract Law, München 2007, 162 .
3 More in M . Fras, In: System Prawa Handlowego . Międzynarodowe Prawo Hand-
lowe, vol . 9, ed . W . Popiołek, Warszawa 2013, 582 . The principle of good faith as a source 
of  the obligation of declaring risk is described in B . Kucharski, Naruszenie powinności 
deklaracji jako podstawa odmowy wypłaty odszkodowania ubezpieczeniowego, Acta Uni-
versitatis Lodziensis . Folia Iuridica 2013, No . 72, 25–28 .
4 R . Merkin, Colinvaux’s Law of Insurance, London 1997, 125 .
5 More in M . Fras, Odpowiedzialność brokera ubezpieczeniowego za niewykonanie 
lub nienależyte wykonanie zobowiązania: rozważania na tle orzecznictwa Sądu Najwyższe-
go, PA 2009, No . 3, 3 et seq . The provision of § 6(1) first sentence of the German Act on 
the insurance contract (Versicherungsvertragsgesetz, BGBl . I, S . 2631) sets out that the 
insurer is obliged to ask the policyholder about his expectations and needs when this is 
justified by difficulties in the evaluation of  the offered insurance or the character of  the 
policyholder or his situation and, taking into consideration the due proportion between 
the cost of consultancy and amount of premium, to provide the policyholder with advice 
and justify that advice . See Art . L 112-2 of the Insurance Code (Code des assurances, Jour-
nal Officiel de la République française, 1978, 1088, modifié) . The direction in which the 
principle under that provision was developed by the French Court of Cassation is analyzed 
in more detail in J . Bigot, La responsabilité civile des sociétés d’assurance à l’égard des as-
sures en droit français, In: Mélanges Roger O . Dalcq, Bruxelles 1994, 25 and the case-law 
cited therein .
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Council of 20 January 2016 on insurance distribution (hereinafter: IDD)6, 
which is intended to ensure more transparency on the part of insurance 
distributors and improvement of the terms of business activities pursued 
by such distributors . Under the provision of Art . 20 IDD, “[p]rior to the 
conclusion of an insurance contract, the insurance distributor shall specify, 
on the basis of information obtained from the customer, the demands and 
the needs of that customer [ . . .] Any contract proposed shall be consistent 
with the customer’s insurance demands and needs .” The demands-and-
needs test becomes a new pre-contractual obligation imposed on insurance 
distributors .
In the IDD’s preamble, Recital 44 reads that: “In order to avoid cases 
of mis-selling, the sale of insurance products should always be accompa-
nied by a demands-and-needs test on the basis of  information obtained 
from the customer . Any insurance product proposed to the customer 
should always be consistent with the customer’s demands and needs and 
be presented in a comprehensible form to allow that customer to make 
an informed decision .” It should be emphasized that the overarching ob-
jective of  the IDD is to ensure, among others, protection to customers, 
which in turn has very strong ties to the issue of mis-selling prevention .
Expansion in the content of the disclosure obligation is in line with 
a  general trend to protect persons considered to be the weaker party 
of an obligational relationship7 .
6 OJ EU L 26 of 2 February 2016 . 
7 The significance of pre-contractual disclosure obligations in the insurance contract 
is also accentuated in the case-law of the ECJ . In the judgment of 9 December 2013 in the 
case C-209/12 Walter Endress v. Allianz Lebensversicherungs AG, Monitor Prawniczy 2014, 
No . 3, 120, the ECJ expressed the opinion that the model assumptions on the sanctions for 
violation of disclosure obligations at the pre-contractual stage, which were developed for 
the purpose of protecting consumers who conclude off-premises contracts, match the needs 
of ensuring protection to policyholders . In justification of that position, it was indicated 
that “insurance contracts are financial products which are complex from the legal perspec-
tive, which may essentially differ depending on the insurer being the offeror and may give 
rise to significant and potential long-term financial obligations, [and at the same time] the 
policyholder has a weaker position in relation to the insurer, and his situation is analogous 
to the one of a consumer concluding an off-premises contract .” This conclusion is material 
inasmuch as it refers to one of  most rigorous, from entrepreneurs’ perspective, models 
of consumer protection in the entire acquis, which is discussed in more detail in B . Gnela, 
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One of the key problems in the insurance market is purchase by cus-
tomers of insurance products that do not match their needs8 . Inadequacy 
of an insurance product leads, in particular, to the following consequences: 
a) absence of insurance protection in respect of specific risks or incomplete 
(partial) insurance protection in respect of a specific risk; b) excessive (un-
necessary) insurance protection .
Moreover, it seems that within the first category it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between two situations:
1) the policyholder wrongly assumes that a specific risk known to him 
is covered by insurance protection on account of  the conclusion 
of a specific contract . Cases falling under this category form a vast 
majority of factual situations examined in judicial practice9;
2) the policyholder does not know that there exists insurance protec-
tion against a specific risk or does not realize the expedience of con-
cluding particular insurance .
Inadequate (incomplete) insurance protection results in encumbrance 
of  the policyholder’s finances because it is the policyholder and not the 
insurer to incur the financial consequences of an insurance accident .
The second category (excessive insurance protection) refers to anoth-
er issue: the policyholder incurs the costs of insurance protection against 
risks to which, generally (in theory or practice), he is not exposed . In other 
words, the insurer offers to the policyholder an  insurance product that 
does not match his needs . Although situations falling under this category 
do not expose insurance customers to an acute (unexpected) necessity to 
incur financial consequences of  an  insurance accident (loss) from their 
own funds, they result in economically unjustified investments in needless 
insurance protection .
Umowa konsumencka w polskim prawie cywilnym i prywatnym międzynarodowym, Warszawa 
2013, 210 et seq .
8 Cf . G .  McMeel, The FSA’s insurance conduct of  business regime: a  revolution 
in  (consumer) insurance law?, Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 2005, 
No . 2, 186, 187 . 
9 P . Tereszkiewicz, Obowiązki informacyjne w umowach o usługi finansowe, Warsza-
wa 2015, 346 .
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2 . THE CONCEPT AND ESSENCE OF LOSS OF CHANCE  
TO BECOME INSURED
One of the challenges before insurance law is to answer the question 
of whether and how one should sanction violations of disclosure obliga-
tions resulting in the absence of the desired insurance protection .
Depending on the position taken in this matter by the law designated 
as applicable, inadequacy of  insurance protection caused by a  violation 
of one of the three forms of disclosure obligation may lead to the policy-
holder being given the right to terminate the unfavorable contract10, the 
insurer being deprived of the possibility to rely on the contractual clauses 
responsible for the inadequacy of  insurance protection11 or the insurer’s 
compensatory liability for a so-called loss of chance to become insured .
Especially extensive investigations on the loss of chance to become in-
sured (perte de chance de s’assurer, perte de chance de souscrire une assurance) 
were conducted in French case-law in the context of group insurance . It is 
indicated that violation of disclosure obligations may result in compensa-
tory liability when the party seeking insurance protection, despite sensible 
evaluation of the situation, cannot enjoy a benefit of the insurance con-
tract which he could have expected in case of materialization of the risk 
against which that party such sought to insure himself12 .
10 P . Tereszkiewicz, Obowiązki informacyjne ……, 346 .
11 D . Krajeski, In: Droit de la responsabilité et des contrats, ed . P . Le Tourneau, Paris 
2012, 985 .
12 See the judgment of the Court of Cassation of 31 January 2012, Cass . com ., 31 
janvier 2012, n° 11-11700; the judgment of the Court of Cassation of 15 December 2011, 
Civ .2e, 15 décembre 2011, n° 10-23889 . The conception of  the loss of  chance to be-
come insured (perte de chance de s’assurer) was commented on by the Court of Cassation 
also in another context in the judgment of 25 January 2012, Cass . soc ., 25 janvier 2012, 
n°11-11 .374 . In that case, the Court of Cassation found that an employer, by omitting to 
notify an employee that it does not pay premium for retirement insurance and by omitting 
to present to the employee a full picture of his retirement situation, deprived the employee 
of a chance of insurance since the employer precluded him from making a reasonable deci-
sion on the voluntary payment of premium in the social security system .
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In common law countries, analogous claims are asserted against in-
surance brokers in connection with the loss of chance to obtain insurance 
protection (the chance of being covered by insurance)13 .
However, the status of  the so-called loss of  chance in  the regime 
of  compensatory liability is highly arguable . Results of  comparative law 
research allow to draw the conclusion that certain legal systems approve 
of  that conception (Belgium, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
emburg, Holland, United Kingdom)14, whereas others to a lesser (Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Sweden) or greater extent (Germany, Portugal) ques-
tion its admissibility15 . It should be added that a part of them analyze the 
compensation for a lost chance in terms of causal link, while others asso-
ciate it with the concept of damage16, and even in such legal systems there 
are doubts as to the specification of  the amount of  the financial benefit 
payable to the injured party17 .
13 A . Kramer, The Law of Contract Damages, Oxford 2014, 280–281 .
14 In the legal systems which are supportive of this conception, it is assumed, in prin-
ciple, that a “loss of chance” may amount to a damage when as a result of specific acts or 
omissions a probability is nullified of the occurrence of an event favorable to the injured 
party even though the materialization of chance is never certain . Apart from the classical 
preconditions to compensatory liability, namely fault and causal link, it is required that 
the damage manifest in the loss of chance be real and serious . More in J .L . Fagnart, La 
perte d’une chance ou la valeur de l’incertain, In: C . Devoet, J .L . Fagnart, C . Paris eds ., 
La réparation du dommage . Question particulières, Louvain-la-Neuve 2006, s . 77–80; see 
S . Martens, R . Zimmermann, In: Digest of European Tort Law . Volume 2: Essential Cases 
on Damage, eds . B . Winiger, H . Koziol, B .A . Koch, R . Zimmermann, Berlin 2011, 1075 
at seq . and the case-law analyzed therein .
15 J .M .  Binon, La réparation de la perte d’une chance dans la jurisprudence eu-
ropéenne: une question de chance?, In: Liber Amicorum Jean-Luc Fagnart, Bruxelles 2008, 
380–381 .
16 E .  Bagińska, Odpowiedzialność deliktowa w  razie niepewności związku przy-
czynowego . Studium prawnoporównawcze, Warszawa 2013, 278 i n . It should be noted 
that discrepancies in  this regard can also be found within a  specific legal system . More 
in  the context of  insurance in  J .  Bigot, La responsabilité . . ., 32 and the literature cited 
therein .
17 One may distinguish between two principal models . The former consists in adju-
dication ex aequo et bono . The other, referred to as the method of proportional compensa-
tion, boils down to the calculation of compensation taking into account the loss of chance 
as expressed in percentage, J .M . Binon, La réparation . . ., 381 .
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It seems that according to the position taken in this regard by Polish 
law, “loss of chance to become insured” may be analyzed in terms of a dam-
age manifest in the loss of profits (lucrum cessans)18, which differs from the 
legally irrelevant potential loss of profit by a high degree of probability19 . 
It may be considered in the violation of disclosure obligations, as a special 
instance of culpa in contrahendo, is not remediable only within the scope 
of negative contractual interest .
The situation is complicated in  the insurance context by the fact 
that such services are, in principle, “standardized .” This problem can be 
analyzed both in terms of the existence of a causal link and at the stage 
of determining the size of the damage . It may not be excluded that on 
the insurance market no services are to be found which would corre-
spond to the expectations of the party seeking insurance protection . The 
insurance adjusted to the needs of the policyholder may also involve the 
necessity to pay a  higher premium which the policyholder would not 
decide (or would not be able) to pay20 . However, if the absence of pro-
tection derives from the insurer’s reliance on a contractual clause limiting 
the insurer’s scope of  liability, the amount of compensation should be 
decreased by the amount of the premium which the injured party would 
have had to pay to obtain the desired insurance protection21 .
18 See E . Bagińska, Odpowiedzialność…, 239 et seq . .; otherwise in  the judgment 
of the Supreme Court of 31 January 2002, IV CKN 642/00, Legalis No . 278037, in whose 
justification an opinion was expressed that „«loss of  chance» may imply both an  actual 
damage and loss of profits (lucrum cessans)” .
19 See M . Nesterowicz, Utrata szansy wyleczenia lub przeżycia w prawie francuskim, 
PiP 2010, No . 3, 42 .
20 In the judgment of 31 May 2011, the Court of Cassation shared the opinion of the 
Court of II Instance which dismissed the compensatory claim for a loss of chance to be-
come insured because the claimant did not prove that if she had been duly notified of the 
terms of insurance, she would have concluded an insurance contract with a wider scope 
of protection, which would imply a need to pay higher insurance premium, Cass . com ., 31 
mai 2011, n° 10-20043 .
21 J . Bigot, La responsabilité..., 33 .
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3 . LAW APPLICABLE TO THE ASSESSMENT OF LIABILITY  
FOR VIOLATION OF DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS BY THE INSURER
The free movement of  insurance services and their dematerialized 
nature are conducive to the conclusion of insurance contracts in circum-
stances where specific elements of a  life situation are relatively dispersed 
and it is impossible to speak of their concentration within one legal area22 . 
As the cross-border insurance market expands23, one should also expect 
a growth in the number of disputes arising from the undue performance 
of precontractual obligations resulting in the failure to obtain the desired 
insurance protection . Because of  the aforementioned dissimilarities be-
tween particular legal systems, it is a  question of  considerable practical 
importance to search for the law applicable to the assessment of liability 
for a loss of chance to become insured attributable to a violation of disclo-
sure obligations .
The discussed issue almost intuitively calls to mind liability for culpa 
in  contrahendo . This concept is not understood uniformly in  individual 
legal systems24 . The catalogue of  actions amounting to instances of  cul-
pa in contrahendo includes, however, the omission to provide information 
which is essential for the decision about concluding the contract or provi-
sion of untrue information, and actions resulting in the reduction in the 
value of the subject of future contractual performance25 .
The EU legislator devoted to the discussed issue a  separate conflict 
of laws rules under Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-con-
22 See E . Kowalewski, Problematyka kolizyjnego prawa ubezpieczeniowego, PiP 2005, 
vol . 2, 21, 23–24; F . Seatzu, Insurance in Private International Law . A European Perspec-
tive, Oxford–Portland 2003, 43 .
23 The term “cross border insurance,” as proposed by E .  Kowalewski, has become 
widespread in Polish legal literature and is used to denote insurance contracts which show 
a connection with more than one legal area . See E . Kowalewski, Prawo ubezpieczeń gosp-
odarczych . Ewolucja i kierunki przemian, Bydgoszcz 1992, 113–119 . 
24 V . Monsalve-Caballero, The Legal and Historical Panorama of Culpa in Contra-
hendo at Contractual Negotiations . An Approach from European and Latin American Law, 
Revista de Derecho 2013, no . 39, 132–145 .
25 M .A .  Zachariasiewicz, In: System Prawa Handlowego . Międzynarodowe Prawo 
Handlowe, vol . 9, ed . W . Popiołek, Warszawa 2013 .
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tractual obligations (hereinafter Rome II)26 . Under Art . 12 of the Rome 
II Regulation, the law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract, regardless of whether 
the contract was actually concluded or not, is, in principle, the law that 
applies to the contract or that would have been applicable to it had it 
been entered into [law applicable to the contract designated under the 
norms of the Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations27 (Rome I)] . Only where on that basis the relevant law cannot 
be found, one should apply conflict of  laws rules based on connectors 
characteristic of tortious obligations (Art . 12(2)) .
According to the conception of autonomous interpretation, the term 
culpa in contrahendo should be read in isolation from the meaning attached 
to it in  the laws of  individual Member States28 . Interpretative guidance 
in this regard is provided by the wording of Recital 30 of the Rome II Reg-
ulation . Although in  the Polish language version of  the Regulation it is 
indicated that the concept of culpa in contrahendo should cover “violations 
of  the secrecy obligation”, the English (duty of  disclosure), German (die 
Verletzung der Offenlegungspflicht) and French (la violation du devoir d’in-
former) language versions of the Regulation point to a positively rendered 
obligation to provide information .
Only seemingly did the legislator put an  end to the disputes about 
the tortious or contractual qualification of the liability for damage inflicted 
in consequence of violating pre-contractual obligations . The scope of ap-
plication of the Rome I Regulation does not cover obligations arising out 
of dealings prior to the conclusion of a contract (Art . 1(2) letter i)29, how-
ever, the provision of Art . 12 of the Rome II Regulation covers only such 
“non-contractual obligations” arising out of dealings prior to the conclusion 
of  a  contract, which, anyhow, follows from the generally specified scope 
26 Regulation (EC) No . 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) (OJ EU L 
199 of 31 .07 .2007, 40) .
27 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council 
of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) (OJ EU L 177 
of 04 .07 .2008, 6, as amended) .
28 See Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation . 
29 See also Recital 10 of the Rome I Regulation .
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of  application of  the Regulation as an  instrument on the law applicable 
to non-contractual obligations (Art . 1(1)) . By juxtaposing the normative 
contents of those provisions, certain authors argue that the liability for vio-
lating pre-contractual obligations is either non-contractual of contractual30 .
Confirmation of such distinction on the conflict of laws level is sought 
in the well-established judicial opinion, developed for the purpose of ap-
plying rules of jurisdiction31 . In the ECJ judgment in the Tacconi case, it 
was emphasized that the jurisdiction to examine disputes relating to the 
liability for damage caused at a  stage prior to the conclusion of a con-
tract should be established under the norms covering claims arising out 
of non-contractual obligations when the damage does not follow from 
violation of a freely incurred obligation32 . In the same way, the Court, at 
least indirectly, expressed the view that liability for damage prior to the 
conclusion of a contract does not constitute a uniform category33 .
In light of the rules outlined above, the insurer’s liability for violation 
of disclosure34 and advisory duties35 imposed on the insurer at the stage 
30 N .  Hage-Chahine, Culpa in  Contrahendo in  European Private International Law, 
Northwestern Journal of  International Law & Business 2012, vol . 32, 466 et seq .; I . Kull, 
M . Torga, Fitting the Estonian Notions of Contractual and Non-contractual Obligations under 
the European Private International Law Instruments, Juridica International 2013, vol . 20, 67 .
31 N . Hage-Chahine, Culpa…, p . 466 et seq .; I . Kull, M . Torga, Fitting…, 67 .
32 Judgment of the ECJ of 17 September 2002 in the case C-334/00 Fonderie Of-
ficine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, ECR 2002, 
p . I-7357, items 22–23 .
33 The contractual qualification of the relationship is decided by whether a violation 
refers to an obligation freely incurred by one party vis-a-vis another at the stage preceding the 
conclusion of a contract . This category includes an obligation under the agreement organiz-
ing the negotiation procedure and other pre-contractual arrangements as well as obligations 
under a promise made prior to the conclusion of  a  contract . P . Grzegorczyk, Jurysdykcja 
krajowa w sprawach z zakresu prawa własności przemysłowej, Warszawa 2007, 559–560 .
34 See Ł . Żarnowiec, Prawo właściwe dla odpowiedzialności z  tytułu culpa in con-
trahendo na podstawie przepisów rozporządzenia Parlamentu Europejskiej i Rady (WE) 
– Rzym II, Europejski Przegląd Sądowy 2010, vol . 2, p . 24 and the German literature cited 
therein; R . Jafferali, Rome II ou la loi applicable aux obligations non contractuelles, Revue 
générale des assurances et de la responsabilité 2008, p . 14399(6) .
35 See H . Heiss, Insurance Contracts in Rome I: Another Recent Failure of the Euro-
pean Legislature, Yearbook for Private International Law 2008, vol . 10, 264; A . Staudinger, 
In: Rome I Regulation . Pocket Commentary, ed . F . Ferrari, Munich 2015, 286 .
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preceding the conclusion of an insurance contract is assessed in accordance 
with the law found under the norm of Art . 12 of the Rome II Regulation36 . 
At the stage of violating disclosure obligations, there is still no freely in-
curred obligation between the parties37 .
Commentators generally agree that the law applicable to culpae in con-
trahendo as found under Art . 12 of the Rome II Regulation decides about 
the compensatory liability for violations of pre-contractual disclosure ob-
ligations38, including the basis and scope of liability (Art . 15 letter a of the 
Rome II Regulation), and about the existence, nature, and assessment 
of damage or the remedy claimed (letter c) .
While delimiting the scope of the law applicable to culpa in contrahen-
do, one should, however, answer the question of whether the law designat-
ed under Art . 12 of the Rome II Regulation is relevant to the assessment 
of the scope and content of disclosure obligations .
Certain authors answer that question in the affirmative39, whereas oth-
ers indicate that it is the law directly designated by the norms of the Rome 
I Regulation that decides about the content of disclosure obligations at the 
pre-contractual stage40 .
This question is of limited practical significance in the context of vi-
olating insurance disclosure obligations . The law applicable to culpae 
36 Ibid, p . 284 . 
37 Ł . Żarnowiec, In: System Prawa Prywatnego . Prawo Prywatne Międzynarodowe, 
ed . M . Pazdan, vol . 20B, 853 .
38 A . Bauknecht, Culpa in contrahendo wobec unifikacji prawa prywatnego w Eu-
ropie, Berlin 2014, 190; M .A .  Zachariasiewicz, Kwalifikacja „culpa in  contrahendo” 
w prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym, Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowe-
go 2008, vol . 3, 37–53 .
39 This comment refers also to such information which will allow the counterparty to 
prevent the conclusion of an agreement under circumstances in which it would be invalid, 
I . Bach, In: Rome II Regulation: Pocket Commentary, ed . P . Huber, Munich 2011, 314; 
see, in reference to precontractual obligations in Belgian law, P . Demolin, L’information 
précontractuelle et la Commission d’arbitrage . Commentaires de la loi du 2 avril 2014 por-
tant insertion du Titre 2 du Livre X du Code de droit économique, Bruxelles 2014, 125; 
see also, in the context of contracts of sale with a cross-border element, G . Dannemann, 
In: The Common European Sales Law in Context: Interactions with English and German 
Law, eds . G . Dannemann, S . Vogenauer, Oxford 2013, 37 .
40 M .A . Zachariasiewicz, Kwalifikacja…, 58 .
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in contrahendo generally corresponds to the law applicable to the insur-
ance contract41 .
These two can be discordant, on an exceptional basis, when the parties 
make a partial choice of law for an insurance contract or a choice of law 
applicable to culpa in contrahendo under Art . 14 of the Rome II Regula-
tion, which at the stage preceding occurrence of the event giving rise to 
a damage (sc. violation of disclosure obligations) is possible only in rela-
tions between entrepreneurs and under a freely negotiated agreement42 .
As opposed to the unlimited choice of law under Art . 14 of the Rome 
II Regulation, the choice of law applicable to an insurance contract, apart 
from insurance contracts covering so-called large risks, is limited in na-
ture43 . If the scope and content of disclosure obligations is specified by the 
relevant law found under the Rome II Regulation, a situation is possible 
when the resolution in respect of  such obligations must be made under 
a law that could not have been chosen by the parties for the insurance con-
tract . It may be considered if the adoption of such solution is legitimate 
since, seemingly, it implies violation to the integrity of the law applicable 
to the insurance contract, which – because of the tendency to protect the 
weaker party of the insurance contract – is generally designated by inflexi-
ble connectors of an objective nature .
It seems that this doubt may be removed by a qualification demarcating 
the spheres of application of the conflict of laws rules under Art . 7 of the 
Rome I Regulation and Art . 12 of  the Rome II Regulation . The former 
provision refers to the performance of obligations arising from a contract44, 
the latter one – to the terms on which the parties reach the stage when 
such obligations are incurred . However, one may defend the position that 
the law applicable to contractual obligations covers the process of reaching 
41 See Art . 12(1) and (2) of the Rome II Regulation .
42 Under the Rome II Regulation, choice of law is admissible after the event giving 
rise to the damage (Art . 14(1) letter a) . Choice of law prior to the occurrence of an event 
giving rise to the damage is admissible only “where all the parties are pursuing a commer-
cial activity” (Art . 14(1) letter b) . 
43 Art . 7(3) of the Rome I Regulation . More in M . Fras, In: System…, 589 .
44 See Art . 12(1) letter b and letter c of the Rome I Regulation, which refer to perfor-
mance of contractual obligations .
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consensus from the very beginning45, that is also at the time of mutual ex-
planation of the shape of the planned contract by its parties .
The first position is supported by the urge to preserve uniformity 
of the applicable law within the regime of compensation for culpae in con-
trahendo. There is a  functional connection between the triggering event 
and its consequences . Evaluation of the cause (sc. what the content of the 
disclosure obligations was and whether they have been violated) in  iso-
lation from its consequences, using norms deriving from different legal 
orders, involves many complications46 .
As has been mentioned above, violation of disclosure obligations may 
lead to the policyholder being granted the rights to influence the content 
of the contract by way of adjusting such content to the policyholder’s ex-
pectations or termination of  the contract or may allow questioning the 
contract’s existence or validity .
Focusing, in the first place, on the last group of situations, one must 
point out that the law applicable to contractual obligations covers the exist-
ence and validity of the contract47, including the right to avoid the conse-
quences of a declaration of intent made in error when the error was caused 
by violation of the disclosure obligations at the pre-contractual stage48 . The 
preconditions to the validity of a legal act, especially ones relating to vices 
of consent, should be assessed under the provisions of the law applicable 
45 M .A . Zachariasiewicz, Kwalifikacja…, 58 .
46 In the context of partial choice of law under the Rome II Regulation, cf . R . Vander 
Elst, L’autonomie de la volonté en droit international privé français et belge, In: Liber Am-
icorum Baron Louis Fredericq, vol . II, Gent 1996, p . 991 . It must be noted that solutions 
from outside the law applicable to culpa in contrahendo may apply under Art . 17, under 
which “[in] assessing the conduct of the person claimed to be liable, account shall be taken, 
as a matter of fact and in so far as is appropriate, of the rules of safety and conduct which 
were in force at the place and time of the event giving rise to the liability .”
47 More on the scope of the law applicable to contractual obligations in respect of in-
surance contracts in M . Fras, K . Pacuła, Umowa ubezpieczenia obowiązkowego w praw-
ie prywatnym międzynarodowym, In: E . Kowalewski, W . Mogilski eds ., System prawny 
ubezpieczeń obowiązkowych . Przesłanki i kierunki reform, Toruń 2014, 178 .
48 R .A . Garcia, La regulación de la responsabilidad precontractual en el Reglamento 
Roma II, InDret . Revista para el Análisis del Derecho 2008, no . 4, 13; P . Rogerson, J . Col-
lier, Collier’s Conflict of Laws, Cambridge 2013, 346 .
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to the contract49 . This solution, according to a well-established tradition 
of private international law, was also adopted within the framework of the 
Rome I Regulation50 . Besides, it would be difficult to neglect the position 
taken in this regard by the law applicable to contractual obligations, which 
provides for specific consequences of vices in the process of reaching con-
sensus by the parties51 . From the perspective of lex causae, the fact that they 
are consequences of untrue information or omission to provide informa-
tion is of secondary importance in relation to the principal question about 
the future of the planned contract52 . It must be pointed out that this may 
give rise to a situation in which the contract is found invalid pursuant to 
the provisions of the law applicable to contractual obligations and, at the 
same time, the policyholder obtains compensation under the law applica-
ble to culpae in contrahendo53 .
As regards other consequences of violating pre–contractual disclosure 
obligations, certain authors are prone to narrow down the scope of  the 
norm under Art . 12 of  the Rome II Regulation only to compensatory 
liability . It is indicated, for example, that a party’s right to terminate the 
contract for violation of disclosure obligations should be evaluated accord-
ing to the law applicable to contractual obligations54 .
49 M . Pazdan, Prawo prywatne międzynarodowe, Warszawa 2012, 127 .
50 Art . 10(1) of  the Rome I  Regulation provides that the existence and validity 
of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would 
govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid . Moreover, the question 
of the return of what had been performed between the parties to a contract which was elim-
inated from the legal practice is also subject to the law applicable to contractual obligations . 
Under Art . 12(1) letter e of the Rome I Regulation, the law applicable to the contract is 
relevant, in particular, to the consequences of the contract’s invalidity .
51 In this spirit, M .A . Zachariasiewicz, In: Tort Law in Poland, Germany and Europe, 
eds . B . Heiderhoff, G . Żmij, Munich 2009, 149 .
52 These circumstances, however, will be taken into consideration as reasons for 
a contract’s (relative or absolute) invalidity .
53 It does not seem that in this case one may expect the intervention of mandatory 
overriding provisions or the public policy clause since certain legal systems allow to chal-
lenge the contract’s legal existence and simultaneous pursuit of compensatory claims .
54 In justification of that position, the scope of the law applicable to contractual ob-
ligations is invoked, as specified in Art . 12(1) of the Rome I Regulation, which relates to 
the consequences of full or partial non-performance of an obligation (letter c) and different 
types of extinction of obligations (letter d); I . Bach, In: Rome II…, 314 .
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While generally agreeing with that position, one should note that 
in  the Rome II Regulation the concept of  loss covers “all consequenc-
es arising out of culpa in contrahendo” (Art . 2(1)) and the applicable law 
found on its basis decides about the existence, nature, and assessment 
of  damage or the remedy claimed in  relation to such damage (Art . 15 
letter c)55 . If the remedy concerning the so understood damage is the right 
exercised in relation to the subsequently concluded contract, one should 
apply in this regard provisions of the law relevant to events referred to as 
culpa in contrahendo . If that law sets out, for example, that a consequence 
of the disclosure obligations being violated by the insurer at the pre-con-
tractual stage is the right to claim the contract’s adjustment56, and this is 
not afforded by the law applicable to contractual obligations, it would not 
be desirable to deprive the policyholder on that basis of  the protection 
deriving from the law applicable to culpae in  contrahendo . Disharmony 
between norms belonging to different legal systems may be removed by 
way of adjustment (l’adaptation)57 .
4 . LAW APPLICABLE TO THE ASSESSMENT  
OF LIABILITY FOR VIOLATION OF DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS  
BY THIRD PARTIES VIS-A-VIS THE INSURER
It  must be noted that in  a  significant number of  cases, insurance 
contracts are concluded through a third party: broker, agent or organizer 
in group insurance contracts .
55 In this spirit, B . Schinkels, In: Rome Regulations . Commentary on the European 
Rules of the Conflict of Laws, ed . G .P . Calliess, Alphen aan den Rijn 2011, 524 . 
56 Citing opinions found in German literature, P . Tereszkiewicz indicates that situa-
tions of violating the advisory obligation may authorize the policyholder to terminate the 
contract for an important reason . See P . Tereszkiewicz, Obowiązki…, 324 .
57 Adjustment may, among others, “consist in the creation of a sui generis synthesis 
of the norms found in different legal systems as though they originated from one legisla-
tor,” and when this proves impossible, “such norms must be replaced by substantial a norm 
of private international law formulated by the judge for the purpose of a  specific case” . 
M . Pazdan, Prawo…, 85 .
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An insurance broker is tied by a legal relationship to a person seeking 
insurance protection with the broker’s involvement or through the broker . 
The provision of adequate information is, besides the duty of competence, 
the most important obligation imposed on every professional, including 
insurance brokers58 . As a result, brokers are obliged to precisely analyze the 
insurance risk relating to the customer (so-called risk assessment) and have 
the functionally related advisory duty regarding the adequacy of the insur-
ance protection . The disclosure and advisory duty of an insurance broker 
are aimed at recommending to the customer the possibly most favorable 
insurance contract, considering the current status of  that customer’s in-
surance protection and his actual needs . Apart from situations in which 
the principal seeks the source of  the broker’s liability in a  tort, it is the 
applicable law found under the Rome I Regulation to resolve in respect 
of the scope and content of the disclosure obligation as well as liability for 
its violation .
On the other hand, there is no contract between an insurance agent 
and a person applying for insurance protection . An agent acts on behalf 
of the insurer to whom, as a rule, he is tied by an agency relationship .
When delimiting the scope of application of the norm under Art . 12 
of the Rome II Regulation, one should resolve whether that norm covers 
the liability of third parties for acts and omissions at the stage preceding 
the conclusion of a contract by the parties . In the doctrine of private inter-
national law, no uniform position has, thus far, been established59 .
Certain authors are of  the opinion that liability for culpa in  contra-
hendo may be incurred only by the parties to the contract to whose con-
clusion the acts made at the pre-contractual stage directly lead60 . On the 
other hand, the liability of third parties is decided by the law found under 
58 See M . Fras, Odpowiedzialność…, 3 et seq .
59 B . Schinkels, In: Rome…, 527–529 . Differences in this regard are also observa-
ble in substantive law . In Polish law, the conception of culpa in contrahendo covers also 
faulty conduct of third parties as long as they are connected with the contractual parties . 
M .A . Zachariasiewicz, In: Tort Law…, 147 . Similar opinion in the context of German law 
is discussed in B .S . Markesinis, H . Unberath, A . Johnston, The German Law of Contract: 
A Comparative Treatise, Oxford 2006, 93 .
60 P . Rogerson, J . Collier, Collier’s…, 346 .
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Art . 4 of  the Rome II Regulation61 . In the doctrine, one may also find 
an  opposite opinion, according to which the scope of  the norm under 
Art . 12 of the Rome II Regulation covers as well the question of liability 
of persons engaged in the contracting process62 .
While adopting the latter position, one should emphasize that the 
norm under Art . 12 refers to obligations “directly relating” to dealings 
prior to the conclusion of a contract63 . This relation should be understood 
as a  functional connection between the pre-contractual obligations and 
the contract to the conclusion of  which the parties are heading64 . This 
feature may refer to acts of third parties who are directly involved in the 
process of reaching consensus between the parties . The proposed solution 
promotes also legal certainty . An active participant of the negotiation pro-
cedure is capable of  anticipating what law is going to be designated as 
applicable to the contract to be concluded by the parties65 . In this way, also 
the interests of the injured party are protected . The same applicable law is 
relevant to the assessment of liability of the counterparty to the negotia-
tion procedure and its representatives66 .
Moreover, delimitation of the scope of Art . 12 of the Rome II Regula-
tion by the criterion of functional relation between pre-contractual obliga-
tions and the planned contract means that the law found under that norm 
is relevant to the assessment of interests of the insured party who has not 
obtained insurance protection due to violation of a disclosure obligation 
in the relation between the insurer and the policyholder67 .
61 A . Dickinson, The Rome II Regulation: The Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations, Oxford 2008, 528; A . Dutta, Das Statut der Haftung aus Vertrag mit Schut-
zwirkung für Dritte, Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts 2009, vol . 4, 
293 et seq .
62 I . Bach (win:) Rome II…, 216 .
63 See Recital 30 of the Rome II Regulation .
64 B . Volders, Culpa in Contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation, Yearbook of Private 
International Law 2007, vol . 9, 131 .
65 I . Bach (in:) Rome II…, 217 . 
66 It must be noted that the law found under the norms of the Rome II Regulation 
resolves whether the insurer is jointly and severally liable for an agent’s acts or omissions 
(Art . 15 letter g) .
67 B . Schinkels, In: Rome…, 528 . 
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A peculiarity of group insurance contracts, deriving from the specific 
position of  the group organizer as a person seeking to ensure insurance 
protection to the group members (insured parties), is that the organizer 
is imposed, to a narrower or wider68 extent, with disclosure obligations . 
A consequence of their violation may be a loss of chance to become in-
sured on the part of a group member .
Search for a conflict of laws rule relevant to the evaluation of a ques-
tion arising against the backdrop of the relation between a group member 
and its organizer should be preceded by a number of comments on the 
very construction of group insurance .
As a rule, group members are tied to the organizer by an extra-insur-
ance internal relationship which justifies the conclusion of the group in-
surance contract . Its establishment predates the formation of the insurance 
relationship . Therefore, the opinion of the Supreme Court has not become 
outdated according to which the disclosure obligation in group insurance 
may follow from an  extra-insurance relationship between the group or-
ganizer and a person seeking insurance protection or from the provisions 
of a contract for the group insurance concluded between the organizer and 
the insurer69 .
Disclosure obligations under the internal relations are an  example 
of  a  freely incurred obligation towards a  group member, which prede-
termines their contractual nature . This internal relationship is character-
ized by the conflict of law’s independence . At the same time, it is an ex-
tra-insurance relationship . In consequence, it is not covered by the scope 
of Art . 7 of the Rome I Regulation .
There are more doubts relating to pre-contractual disclosure obliga-
tions whose source is outside the internal relationship .
It is indicated in the literature that the conclusion of a group insur-
ance contract results in  the establishment – through the policyholder – 
of a  legal relationship between the insurer and the insured party . In the 
68 Under Art . L 141-4 of the Insurance Code, the group organizer delivers to the in-
sured party a document prepared by the insurer which contains, among others, information 
on the scope of protection under the insurance contract . The scope of that duty is strongly 
shaped by case-law, with a clear tendency for its extension . D . Krajeski, In: Droit…, 1429 .
69 Resolution of  the Court Supreme of  8  November 1977, I  PZP 48/77, Legalis 
No . 20483 .
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author’s opinion, this observation is universal although “[in] certain legal 
systems [group insurance] is treated as a multitude of individual insurance 
relationships between the same policyholder and the insurance company . 
Others classify the group insurance contract as a framework agreement be-
tween the policyholder and the insurance company, relating to individual 
insurance relationships emerging between the insurance company and the 
insured parties .”70 
In the context of French law, a distinction is made, already within the 
framework of one substantive law regime, between group insurance with 
compulsory accession (assurance de groupe à l’adhésion obligatoire), in which 
the insurance protection is established automatically upon obtaining the 
status of a group member and follows from a contract concluded between 
the group organizer (policyholder) and the insurer, and group insurance 
with elective accession (assurance de groupe à l’adhésion facultative), which 
forms a peculiar legal construction, a combination of individual insurance 
with a special type of framework agreement between the insurer and the 
group organizer . The framework agreement is not an insurance contract . 
On the other hand, an individual insurance contract holds between each 
of the group members (insured parties) and the insurer71 . It  is generally 
concluded, with the effect of  the establishment of  insurance protection, 
as a result of a declaration of accession being made .
Similarly, in  German literature, authors distinguish between the 
so-called proper group insurance contract (echte Gruppenversicherung), 
in which the group organizer is at the same time the policyholder, and 
the so-called improper group insurance contract (unechte Gruppenver-
sicherung), which is based on the abovementioned construction of a frame-
work agreement between the organizer and the insurer72 .
70 M . Kropka, Prawo właściwe dla umowy ubezpieczenia następstw nieszczęśliwych 
wypadków . Glosa do wyroku Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 3  lutego 2006 r ., II PK 152/05, 
Problemy Prawa Prywatnego Międzynarodowego 2007, vol . 2, 201–202 and the literature 
cited therein .
71 J .  Bigot, In: Traité de Droit des assurances . Tome 3 . Le contrat d’assurance, 
ed . J . Bigot, Paris 2002, 132 et seq .; L . Mayaux , In: Traité de Droit des assurances . Tome 4 . 
Les assurances de personnes, ed . J . Bigot, Paris 2007, 666 et seq .
72 More in  F .  Herdter, Der Gruppenversicherungsvertrag – Grundlagen und aus-
gewählte Problemfelder, Karlsruhe 2010, 14 et seq .; This terminology was coined by 
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This solution was also adopted by the authors of the model instrument 
governing insurance contracts, the Principles of European Insurance Con-
tract Law (PEICL)73, which is developed with the use of results of compar-
ative law research . Researchers from the Restatement Group decided to in-
troduce a distinction between group insurance with compulsory (accessory 
group insurance) and elective (elective group insurance) accession74 .
It would be difficult to speak of a violation of disclosure obligations 
with the effect of  a  lost chance to become insured in  case of  group in-
surance with compulsory accession . In this case, protection emerges au-
tomatically . It  is a consequence of adherence to the group . If the group 
organizer (policyholder) concludes for the benefit of the group’s member 
(insured party) a group insurance contract which does not ensure to the 
member the desired level of protection, the assessment of liability for such 
a situation should be referred to the internal relationship . It is the internal 
relationship that may give rise to the obligation to ensure specific protec-
tion in the form of insurance to the group member .
How to find the law applicable to the assessment of liability of a group 
organizer for violation of disclosure obligations in a group insurance con-
tract with elective accession if such obligations arise from the agreement 
between the organizer and the insurer?
A group member is not a party to that agreement . This seems to decide 
about the non-contractual character of  the organizer’s liability for dam-
age caused to a group member at the stage prior to his accession to the 
insurance75 . In the doctrine of private international law, it is nevertheless 
H . Millauer, Rechtsgrundsätze der Gruppenversicherung, Karlsruhe 1954, 107 et seq .
73 M . Lakhan, H . Heiss, An Optional Instrument for European Insurance Contract 
Law, Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 2010, vol . 26, 1–11 .
74 D . Fuchs, Ubezpieczenia grupowe w europejskiej umowie ubezpieczenia, O po-
trzebie uregulowania ubezpieczeń grupowych, conference materials, Warsaw 15 Novem-
ber 2013  r .; A .  Daszewski, A .  Dąbrowska, O  potrzebie zmiany przepisów kodeksu cy-
wilnego o  umowie ubezpieczenia w  kontekście uregulowania ubezpieczeń grupowych, 
In: M . Serwach ed ., Rynek ubezpieczeniowy – nadregulacja czy niedoregulowanie, Łódź 
2014, 187 .
75 The situation of a group member in relation to the group’s organizer is quite differ-
ent from the situation of an insured party in relation to the insurer obliged to provide him 
with insurance protection . The law applicable to the insurance contract is relevant to the 
assessment of rights of a third party for whose benefit specific performance was stipulated 
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assumed that the question of personal liability of an agent for the damage 
caused as a consequence of the undue performance of disclosure obliga-
tions is decided by the law found under Art . 12 of the Rome II Regula-
tion76 . This observation refers to all situations in which a party decides 
to enter into the contract acting in reliance on the information provided 
by a third party77, even if such third party is tied to the counterparty by 
a contractual relationship .
5 . JURISDICTION IN MATTERS RELATING TO THE LOSS OF CHANCE  
TO BECOME INSURED
Under the Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of  the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial mat-
ters78 (hereinafter Brussels I bis Regulation), jurisdiction in matters relat-
ing to insurance is asymmetrical . The rules of jurisdiction are different de-
pending on whether the “weaker party” of an insurance relationship takes 
the role of claimant or defendant . The policyholder, insured party, bene-
ficiary or injured party having a claim under the insurance relationship is 
by the parties . See A . Bělohlávek, Rozporządzenie Rzym I . Konwencja rzymska . Komen-
tarz, vol . 2, Warszawa 2010, 185 . However, one should not equate this formula with a con-
struction of a contract with a protective consequence for a third party (Vertrag mit Schut-
zwirkung für Dritte), by which certain German authors explain the scope of obligations 
of the group organizer towards the group’s members . It assumes that a debtor is obliged to 
exercise, while performing, special care not only vis-a-vis the creditor but also certain third 
parties (e .g . in the context of disclosure obligations) . B . Hesse, Interessenkonflikte bei der 
Lebensversicherung zugunsten Dritter, Karlsruhe 1981, 150 . This obligation, however, is 
accessory to the main performance stipulated for the creditor’s benefit . A third party may 
not demand such performance for the third party’s benefit, which is why this construction 
is denied contractual nature by P . Mankowski, In: Brussels I Regulation, eds . U . Magnus, 
P . Mankowski, München 2007, 121 . 
76 I . Bach (in:) Rome II…, 217 .
77 B . Schinkels, In: Rome…, 528 .
78 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (OJ EU L 351 of 20 .12 .2012, 1, as amended) .
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allowed to sue the insurer before a forum expedient to such weaker party, 
determined according to the residence of the claimant, whereas the insurer 
may generally sue exclusively before the courts of the country of residence 
of the defendant .
Special rules of  jurisdiction apply to “matters relating to insurance” 
(Art . 10) . Therefore, it seems that by delimiting the scope of their applica-
tion, one should limit oneself to matters pertaining to contractual claims . 
However, in light of the provision of Art . 12 of the Rome II Regulation 
and its Recital 30, it is unlikely that such qualification of claims for the 
violation of pre-contractual disclosure obligations is going to be adopted 
in case-law .
Whereas the ECJ, in the Tacconi case, drew attention to the fact that 
pre-contractual obligations may assume a contractual or non-contractual 
form, after the entry into force of the Rome II Regulation, the lawmaker 
clearly leans towards the non-contractual qualification of claims for viola-
tion of pre-contractual disclosure obligations . Bearing in mind the postu-
late of coherence between the Rome Regulations and the Regulation on 
jurisdiction, the introduction of a special conflict of laws rule for non-con-
tractual obligations arising out of dealings will not be without significance 
for the application of jurisdiction rules79 . Such direction in the delimita-
tion of the scope of jurisdiction norms, consistent with the non-contractu-
al qualification of culpa in contrahendo under the Rome II Regulation, was 
anticipated in the literature even prior to its entry into force80 .
Disputes for the payment of  compensation for a  lost chance to be-
come insured will probably be considered by the courts of  the Member 
79 This does not mean, however, that it is the only acceptable way of thinking . It may 
be also accepted that claims for violation of precontractual disclosure obligations are of con-
tractual nature in the jurisdictional context, which is not consistent with their qualification 
in the conflict of laws context . This point of view is amply discussed in N . Hage-Chahine, 
Culpa…, 468–470 .
80 P . Mankowski, In: Brussels…, 117; See also J . Gołaczyński, Jurysdykcja, uznawan-
ie orzeczeń sądowych oraz ich wykonywanie w  sprawach cywilnych i  handlowych . 
Rozporządzenie Parlamentu Europejskiego i  Rady (UE) nr  1215/2012 . Komentarz, 
Warszawa 2015, 34 et seq, where the author suggests that the non-contractual qualification 
of claims relating to a strike, as dictated by the scope of the norm under Art . 9 of the Rome 
II Regulation, predetermines also their qualification in the area of jurisdiction .
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State in which the sued insurer is domiciled (Art . 4(1) of the Brussels I bis 
Regulation) or the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred 
(Art . 7 item 2) . The same terms will apply in case of claims asserted against 
an agent .
If, however, the damage was caused by an act of an agent for whom 
the insurer is responsible, a suit against the insurance company may also 
be brought before the court of  the place where the agency is situated 
(Art . 7 item 5) . The provision of Art . 7 item 5 allows to base jurisdiction 
on the place where the agent is situated in matters involving disputes aris-
ing out of such agent’s activities . The scope of that norm includes as well 
non-contractual disputes81 .
One may speak of existence of a “branch, agency or establishment” 
of  the main entrepreneur if a  given entity has a  management structure 
and property structure of such type that a third party may negotiate con-
tracts with such entity without a need of direct involvement of that en-
trepreneur although, eventually, the legal relationship will be established 
between such entrepreneur and the third party82 . The absence of control 
over the activities of a given entity and absence of the duty to follow the 
main entrepreneur’s orders preclude the conclusion that a given entity is 
a branch, agency or establishment83 . Analysis of the ties between a branch 
and the main entrepreneur may not be limited exclusively to the exami-
nation of formal organizational and legal ties . Even in the absence of such 
ties, the admissibility to recognize a given entity as a branch is decided by 
the objective relations between such entities from the perspective of third 
parties84 .
Most legal literature in which an attempt is made to transpose those 
patterns to insurance relationships concentrates on the juxtaposition 
of an insurance broker and an insurance agent, and uses the term “branch, 
81 Judgment of  the ECJ of  22 November 1978 in  the case 33/78 Somafer SA 
v . Saar-Fergnas AG, ECR 1978, 2183, item 13 .
82 Ibid, item 12 .
83 Judgment of the ECJ of 6 October 1976 in the case 14/76 A . De Bloos, SPRL 
v . Société en commandite par actions Bouyer, ECR 1977, p . 149, item 20–21 .
84 Judgment of the ECJ of 9 December 1987 in the case 218/86 SAR Schotte GmbH 
v . Parfums Rothschild SARL, ECR 1987, p . 4905, item 14–17 .
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establishment or agency” only in reference to the latter85 . This distinction 
is based on the conviction that a broker has an autonomous position vis-
a-vis the insurer, whereas an agent acts in correlation with the insurer86 . In 
consequence, an entity that pursues its activities independently and is not 
obliged to follow the instructions it is given may not be considered to be 
a branch of the agency87 .
A broker infringing a disclosure obligation unduly performs the con-
tract with the principal . Such principal may bring a claim for a loss of chance 
of insuring before the courts of the country of the broker’s domicile (Art . 
4 item 1 of the Brussels I bis Regulation) or before the court of the country 
in which, under the contract, brokerage services were provided or should 
have been provided (Art . 7 item1 letter b) . However, the connector under 
Art . 7 item 1 letter b of the Regulation may sometimes be a source of trou-
ble . The place of provision of the service should be established, in the first 
place, according to the intention of the parties as expressed in the content 
of  the contract . Only secondarily, “where the provisions of  the contract 
do not permit determination of the place of the main rendition of servic-
es,” one should alternatively consider the place where the service provider 
acted if such determination is not contrary to “the parties’ intention as ex-
pressed in the provisions of the agreement .”88 Following that rule, the Polish 
Supreme Court expressed an opinion that the place of provision of  legal 
consultancy services is the seat of the service provider, where draft agree-
ments and opinions are drawn up, and not the place where such documents 
are used by their recipients89 . Applying these remarks to the legal position 
85 See K .F .  Tsang, Forum Shopping in  European Insurance Litigation: What We 
Have Learned from New Hampshire Insurance Co . v . Strabag Bau, Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review 2010, vol . 32, 246, footnote 39 .
86 H .  Heiss, In: Brussels I  Regulation, eds . U .  Magnus, P .  Mankowski, München 
2007, 281–282 . 
87 See, in  the context of  the Lugano Convention, R .  Stefanicki, Jurysdykcja 
w sprawach ubezpieczeniowych według Konwencji Lugańskiej, WU 1999, vol . 9–10, 38 .
88 Judgment of the ECJ of 11 March 2010 in the case C-19/09 Wood Floor Solutions 
Andreas Domberger GmbH v. Silva Trade SA, ECR 2010, p . I-02121, items 38, 40 – here-
inafter, the ECJ judgment in the Wood Floor case.
89 Decision of the Supreme Court of 22 January 2015, I CSK 668/13, Legalis No . 
1200707 .
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of a broker, one may assume that – unless the parties agreed otherwise – the 
place of performance of a service consisting in preparation of an insurance 
program is the broker’s seat, even if the broker carries out, under the con-
cluded contract, a number of additional (auxiliary) activities out of his seat . 
In case of a multitude of places of providing services in different Member 
States, the goal should be to indicate one court competent for all claims 
arising out of the contract . This will be decided by the place of the main 
performance90, which, however, does not have to correspond to the broker’s 
domicile91 . On a side note, it must be indicated that the injured party may 
also base the broker’s liability on a tort (Art . 7 item 5) . However, the court 
competent on that basis has no jurisdiction to resolve a case for compensa-
tion brought on contractual grounds92 .
As far as the liability of an organizer in group insurance is concerned, 
the starting point is an analysis of the ties between such an organizer and 
a group member .
If the disclosure duty follows from an  obligation freely incurred as 
a part of an extra-insurance internal relationship, cases for compensation 
based on its violation are contractual . For example, in  employee group 
insurance contracts, special norms on employment contracts will apply 
(Art . 20 and following of the Brussels I bis Regulation) .
It seems that is if the disclosure obligation follows from a framework 
agreement organizing the insurance, jurisdiction should be established 
under the non-contractual qualification of  a  claim . A  member of  the 
group is not a party to that agreement although it is concluded in such 
member’s interest .
90 ECJ decision in the Wood Floor case, items 27 and 33 .
91 Determination of the place of main performance may imply complications when 
the service provider, in a contract similar to insurance intermediation or legal consultancy, 
undertakes primarily to act in the name and on behalf of the client vis-a-vis third parties . 
Cf . K . Pacuła, Forum shopping i kolizyjnoprawne obejście prawa w działalności ubezpiec-
zeniowych kancelarii odszkodowawczych, In: E . Kowalewski ed ., Doradztwo odszkodowa-
wcze w Polsce . Potrzeba regulacji prawnej, Toruń 2015, 177 et seq .
92 In this regard, the opinion of M . Pazdan has not become outdated, as expressed 
in M . Pazdan, Zbieg odpowiedzialności cywilnej ex contractu i ex delicto w prawie pry-
watnym międzynarodowym, In: J . Błeszyński, J . Rajski eds ., Rozprawy z prawa cywilnego . 
Księga pamiątkowa ku czci Witolda Czachórskiego, Warszawa 1985, 294 .
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6 . CONCLUSION
Despite the specific conflict of  laws rule for the liability for culpa 
in contrahendo in the Rome II Regulation, the law applicable to the assess-
ment of the liability for a loss of chance to become insured is, in principle, 
the law relevant to the insurance contract itself . Under Art . 12(1) of the 
Rome II Regulation, the law applicable in this case is basically lex contrac-
tus in negotio.
More doubts are raised by the assessment of the same issue on the level 
of  jurisdiction . One may consider if, in  the case of disputes concerning 
the liability for violation of insurance disclosure obligations, the claimant 
should not take advantage of  the special rules of  the jurisdiction from 
Chapter II Section 3 of the Brussels I bis Regulation . This is supported also 
by the need to protect the policyholders and the insured parties . If one is 
to apply the comments made in the context of the insurer’s pre-contractual 
obligations to analogous obligations in respect of the declaration of risk, 
which are imposed on the weaker party of the insurance contract, it will 
turn out that in a dispute arising from their violation such person, acting 
as the defendant, will not enjoy the protection under the rules of jurisdic-
tion contained in Chapter II Section 3 of the Regulation .
An inducement in this regard is offered by Art . 10 of the Brussels I bis 
Regulation, which delimits the scope of application of special jurisdiction 
rules “in matters relating to insurance .” Its wording differs from the two 
remaining provisions of similar nature, which provide respectively for the 
application of special jurisdiction rules if the subject of the proceedings is 
an employment contract or claims under an employment contract (Art . 
20(1)) or a contract or claim under a contract concluded by a consumer 
(Art . 17) . In the provisions of Art . 10 and following of the Brussels I bis 
Regulation, it is not clearly indicated that the claim should arise from 
“an insurance contract,” which may open the way for the coverage by these 
provisions of disputes with non-contractual qualification93 .
93 It does not seem that this point of view is precluded by the assumption that the 
discussed norms are exceptions to a general rule and, as such, may not be interpreted ex-
tensively . The argument based on the exceptiones non sunt extendendae principle may not 
result in rendering invalid those provisions which are protective in nature . See the opinion 
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The case-law points as well to the possibility to widen the scope of ap-
plication of  those norms to disputes conducted on the initiative of  the 
injured parties94, their legal successors95, and disputes conducted against 
the injured parties themselves96 or against persons merely related to the 
insurance relationship97 . These persons are not the parties to the insurance 
contract . However, they take advantage of special protection in the area 
of  jurisdiction on account of  the endeavor to implement the postulate 
of protecting the “weaker party .” As a consequence, a conclusion may be 
drawn that, under the provisions of  Chapter II Section 3, the relation 
between the dispute and the insurance contract should not be understood 
narrowly if this could stand in opposition with the purpose of special ju-
risdiction rules .
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